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Recent Cases
APPELLATE PIOCEDURE-KENTUCKY RuLEs OF CIVm PROCEDURE-DIs-
MISSAL OF APPEALS FOR FAILURE TO CoMPLY Wrn T=E RuLEs-Appel-
lant filed the entire record of the trial proceedings with the Clerk
of the Court of Appeals. No designation of the portions of the record
to be included was served upon the appellee, nor filed with the cir-
cuit court clerk pursuant to Rule 75.01 of the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure.' Appellee moved for dismissal on the ground that
the appellant had failed to comply with the rule. Held: Dismissed.
Failure to comply with the provisions of CR 75.01 requiring the appel-
lant to serve upon the appellee and, file with the circuit court clerk
a designation of the portions of the record to be included on appeal
warrants dismissal of the appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the
entire record has been led. Commonwealth v. Black, 829 S.W.2d 192
(Ky. 1959).
Within the framework of the fair and impartial administration of
justice, the paramount purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is
to expedite the disposition of litigation. To this end, some of the
rules are somewhat arbitrary. This is necessarily so since the end to be
attained does not lend itself to the formulation of flexible rules. It is
the purpose here to examine some of the rules, the purpose for their
inclusion and the penalties imposed for their infraction.
The dismissal of an appeal is certainly an extreme penalty. At
least to some the penalty becomes even more severe when it is based
upon the infraction of a rule which may be denominated a "pure
technicality." It cannot be denied that some purely technical rules
are indispensable to the orderly administration of justice and of
necessity are included in the Rules of Civil Procedure. But, the
penalty imposed for non-compliance with some of the rules could
bear scrutiny and possibly an alternative solution implemented.
it is doubtful that anyone would question the correctness of the
proposition that the penalty imposed for the infraction of any rule
or any law should bear some reasonable relation to the purpose of
1Ky. R. Civ. P. 75.01 (hereinafter cited as CR) provides in part:
Promptly after an a ppeal .. . is taken the appellant shall serve upon
the appellee and ftle with the circuit court a designation of the
portions of the record . . . to be contained in the record on appeal.
... Within 10 days after the service and filing of such designation
any other party to the' appeal may serve and file a designation of
of additional portions of the record . . . to be included.
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the rule or law and the end to be attained through its enforcement.
In other areas of the law this proposition is a cardinal principle. The
extent of liability of the tortfeasor is dependent upon the severity
of the injury inflicted.2 The punishment meted out to the criminal
is related to the heinousness of his crime.3 The liability of one who
breachs his contract is commensurate with the loss sustained as a
result of the breach.4 But, the penalty imposed upon the lawyer and
his client for the infraction of a procedural rule may in some in-
stances be completely out of proportion to the error committed.
The point of contention is not with the policy of the court 5 re-
quiring strict compliance with the steps requisite to perfecting an
appeal, but rather with the penalty which it imposes for non-com-
pliance with the rule requiring designation of the portions of the
record by the appellant, when the complete record is filed with the
court.
The principal case marks the greatest extent to which the court
has thus far gone in implementing its policy of strict adherence.
Until this decision, appeals which were dismissed for non-compliance
could be placed in two categories. In the first category are cases
where non-compliance resulted in failure of the court to obtain
jurisdiction to review. 6 The second category includes cases in which
the non-compliance, if permitted, would result in injustice or prej-
udice to the appellee.7
Failure to give notice within the prescribed thirty-day period8
that an appeal is being taken has resulted in the dismissal of the
appeal.9 The court held this requirement to be "jurisdictional." There-
fore, failure to comply resulted in a lack of jurisdiction to review.
2 See Reed v. Mercer County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 646, 295 S.W. 995
(1927) (dictum).
3 15 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 507, at 156 (1938).
415 Am. Jur. Damages § 12 (1938).
5 The following is a statement of the policy of the court by Judge Bird in the
principal case:
We have . . . adopted a rule of strict compliance concerning the
steps requisite to perfecting an appeal in this Court. Consequently
we dismiss actions for non-compliance with the rules governing the
requisite steps.
829 S.W.2d at 193.6 Davis v. Underwood, 283 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1955) (failure to make a
motion for appeal as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. § 21.080 where the amount
in controversy is less than twenty-five hundred but more than two hundred
dollars); Electric Plant Bd. of City of Hopkinsville v. Stephens, 273 S.W.2d
817 (Ky. 1954) (failure to give notice that an appeal was being taken within
the 30 day period provided by CR 73.02).
7 See Wallace v. Walters & Keene Motor Co., 280 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1955).
8CR 73.02.
9 Electric Plant Bd. of City of Hopkinsville v. Stephens, supra note 6.
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The rule requiring the appellant to give notice that an appeal is being
taken prevents the appellant from taking an appeal without giving
the appellee a fair opportunity to prepare and present his case. It
would be difficult to imagine a situation in which an appellee could
sustain greater prejudice than having the litigation appealed with-
out notice being given him in time to give him the proper oppor-
tunity to prepare. The penalty of dismissal could be justified even if
this rule were not jurisdictional. Certainly a party should not with
impunity be permitted to disregard the requirement of this rule and
thereby inflict upon his adversary the prejudice which it was designed
to prevent.
Appeals are dismissed for failure to file the record within the
sixty-day limit imposed by CR 73.08.10 The purpose of this rule is
to prevent litigation being dragged out over a long period of time
to the prejudice or harassment of the adverse party. Further, the rule
prevents a party from being kept in a state of uncertainty as to his
rights or liabilities, which have not been finally determined by the
Court of Appeals. The rule enhances the judicial policy that parties
are entitled to a determination of their rights without undue delay.
To permit an appeal where the appellant has failed to comply with
this rule would in many cases place the appellee at a great dis-
advantage and subject him to severe prejudice. The end to be at-
tained through this requirement is of such importance that failure
to comply therewith justifies the penalty of dismissal.
If an appellant designates less than the complete record, he is
required to serve with the designation a statement of the points on
which he intends to rely. Failure to comply with this rule has re-
sulted in dismissal of the appeal.'2 But for this rule an appellant
could secure a review upon an abbreviated record containing only
the portions favorable to his cause. In such event the appellee could
only speculate as to the remaining portions of the record which should
be included to enable him to properly present a defense to appellant's
contentions. Obviously, such a result would be unfair and prejudicial.
Through designation of less than the complete record the appellant
secures the reduction of time and cost in prosecuting the appeal.
3.0 Belk-Simpson Co., Inc. v. Hill, 288 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1956). See also
Clay, "The Use and Abuse of the Rules of Civil Procedure," 47 Ky. L. J. 161,
173 (1959).
11 CR 75.04 provides in part:
If the appellant does not designate for inclusion the complete record
... he shall serve with his designation a concise statement of the
points on which he intends to rely on the appeal. [Emphasis added.]
12 Hawkins v. Hoskinson, 324 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1959); Knight v. Resolute
Insurance Co., 321 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1959).
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These benefits were anticipated before the rule was finally adopted.' 3
If the appellant obtains these benefits it is only fair that he should
inform the appellee of the points on which he intends to rely. Where
he attempts to take advantage of the benefits without complying with
the conditions upon which the benefits are conferred, he has no room
to complain when the appeal is dismissed.
It could hardly be said that dismissal is not justified in the two
foregoing categories. However, if the court obtains jurisdiction and
no prejudice to the appellee arises from the non-compliance, the
penalty of dismissal seems too severe. It is not advocated that the
appellant should at his pleasure disregard the rules, but rather in
such cases the penalty should be lessened.
Apparently the Court of Appeals has not determined that the re-
quirement of designation of the record is jurisdictional. Failure to
designate, therefore, is not fatal upon jurisdictional grounds. Where
the entire record is filed with the court it is difficult to see how the
appellee is prejudiced by failure to designate. The purpose of CR
75.01 is to permit use of an abbreviated record on appeal. CR 75.05
imposes a penalty on any party who includes in the record desig-
nated any matter not essential to the decision of the questions raised
on appeal.14 In conjunction with CR 75.04, requiring a statement of
points on which the appellant intends to rely, if less than the com-
plete record is designated, the designation enables the appellee to
determine additional portions of the record which need be designated
in order to properly present the complete picture of the issues.' 5 If
the entire record is necessary on appeal, and it is filed, the purpose
of the rule is served. Failure to designate becomes a defect of such
minor proportions that it should not result in dismissal.
For an additional reason it seems that the penalty of dismissal
is unwarranted. Although it may be implied from CR 75.04 that a
designation must be made when the entire record is to be included,' 6
CR 75.01 is susceptible of a contrary interpretation. It appears to be
implicit in the rule that compliance was intended to be mandatory
only where less than the complete record is included. The rule does
13 See Kentucky Civil Code Committee Report to Annual District Bar Meet-
ings 88 (August and September 1951).
14 CR 75.05 provides in part:
No party shall designate any matter not essential to the decision of the
questions presented by the appeal. For any infraction of this Rule...
the Court of Appeals may withhold or impose costs as the circum-
stances of the case and discouragement of like conduct in the future
may require; and costs may be imposed upon offending attorneys or
parties.
15 See Wallace v. Walters & Keene Motor Co., supra note 7.
16 CR 75.04, italicized portion, supra note 11.
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not expressly provide for a designation if the complete record is to
be included. The provisions are in terms of "portions" of the record.
Logically speaking it could be properly contended that even though
the rule is stated in terms of "portions," it is nonetheless applicable
where the entire record is involved, since all the portions are neces-
sary to make up the whole. But, the second sentence of the rule pro-
vides an opportunity for counter-designation of "additional por-
tions" of the record to be included. Certainly this part of the rule
would be unnecessary except where the appellant designated less
than the complete record. The tenor and terms of the rule tend to
foster the impression that the rule was drafted with the abbreviated
record being of paramount concern. In view of the purpose of the
proponents of the rules to lessen the size of the record on appeal,lT
it appears that when the rule was drafted they did not intend to re-
quire the designation of the complete record. The situation con-
templated by the drafters of the rules, as evinced by the terms of the
rule and the committee's report,'8 was where the appellant would or
should designate less than the complete record, if such would be
sufficient to present all the issues to be reviewed.
Since there is no readily apparent purpose for the designation re-
quirement when the complete record is to be filed, its comparative
unimportance leads to the conclusion that the drafters did not intend
to make such designation an indispensable requirement for the per-
fection of an appeal. If the requirement was not intended, certainly
the appeal should not be dismissed in such cases. If, however, this
rationalization is incorrect and the requirement was intended, its
relative unimportance should justify the imposition of a less severe
penalty where the appellant has failed to comply.
Conceding the premise that "[if] the rules of procedure are ignored
in order to do substantial justice on the merits in a particular case,
there are no rules,"19 still if the enforcement of the rule results in a
penalty which is too severe, it should be modified. It would seem
that the court could follow its policy of strict adherence through the
imposition of a lesser penalty. No greater wrong is done by failing
to designate when the whole record is filed than by designating more
of the record than is necessary to the disposition of the issues. Yet, in
the latter instance, the appeal is not dismissed, although costs may be
17 See Kentucky Civil Code Committee Report to Annual District Bar
Meetings 38-39 (August and September 1951).
181ibid.
19 Quoted in City of Louisville v. Christian Business Women's Club, Inc.,
306 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Ky. 1957), and cited with approval in the principal case.
329 S.W.2d at 193.
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imposed to deter like conduct.20 A similar penalty should be sufficient
to insure strict adherence to CR 75.01, without denying a review on
the merits.
As has been stated, the lawyer is supposed to be and must be a
trained technician and must have a sound working knowledge of the
tools of his trade; he must properly use the Rules of Civil Procedure
in order to secure a review of his case by the court.21 However, since
lawyers are susceptible to making mistakes, they and their clients
should not have to bear the burden of dismissal when their mistakes
result in no injustice or prejudice to their adversaries.
William A. Logan
CRIUMNAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH AND SEimE-AmissIriarr OF EvDRNcE
OBTAINED IN SEARC INCIDENTAL TO ARREsT WrmoTJ A WARRANT.
Defendant was arrested for drunken driving. He was arrested without
a warrant after officers noticed his car being driven in an erratic man-
ner. Upon searching the car, the arresting officers found a pistol con-
cealed under a coat on the front seat. Defendant was taken to jail
and one of the officers swore out a warrant for drunken driving.
While this charge was pending, defendant was indicted and tried
for carrying concealed a deadly weapon. Defendant made a timely
motion to suppress all evidence obtained in the search of the auto-
mobile, claiming that the evidence was incompetent because the pri-
mary question of his guilt or innocence of the drunken driving charge
had never been determined. The trial court overruled the motion
and admitted the evidence. The jury were instructed that if they
believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated
his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating beverages
in the presence of the arresting officers, and if they further believed
that he carried concealed a deadly weapon, they would find him
guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and defendant appealed
from a judgment entered thereon. Held: The trial court erred in
admitting the evidence and the judgment of conviction was re-
versed. "Where an original and separate charge based on the of-
fense for which the accused was arrested is pending in a court and
subsequently the accused is charged in another court of a separate
offense, no evidence which was obtained solely as a result of a search
2 0 CR 75.05, supra note 14.
21 See Clay, "The Use and Abuse of the Rules of Civil Procedure," 47 Ky.
L.J. 161 passim (1959).
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